Random Shots - High Expectations

If investors were hoping that the strength of commodities was sign that decoupling, led by Asia and Latam, were running on course to help the global economy expanding, events last week must surely have extinquished such hopes. Indeed, it was always a question of commodities and emerging markets catching up to the ongoing slaugther in Europe. 

Indeed, what seems to be main question now is whether the US economy will avoid a recession and, as a consequence, just how bad it has to get before the Fed starts another round of shock and awe QE. In this sense, I also always thought that expectations of emerging market foreign exchange reserves bailing out Europe and/or central banks easing aggressively to support the global economy were pinned on expectations that after all were too high. 

(Quote Bloomberg)

The world’s largest emerging economies will not act as a bloc to ease Europe’s financial crisis, Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak said.“It’s impossible, I’m certain of that,” Storchak told reporters today in Washington. “If the BRICS are going to act to overcome the euro zone’s financial problems, then it will be based on the possibilities presented by working through the International Monetary Fund.”Finance ministry and central bank officials from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa met before this week’s IMF annual meeting to discuss coordinating policy as Europe reels from a sovereign debt crisis and growth slows in the U.S. There is a “high” danger that Greece will not fulfill all of its debt obligations, Storchak said.

As for the EM tightening cycle I think that while we may certainly see an easing of pace or perhaps even a full stop of tightening measures I think a reversal is out of the question. This is the case even if the recent strong correction in commodities and the global slowdown is likely to make inflation a non issue going forward. The point is that inflation lags the cycle and if the central banks are fixed on this measure it will take some time before the data allows decisive action unless of course the future is suddenly discounted in a radically different way due to rising downside risks. 

In India, the tightening cycle is surely near its end with the yield curve already flat as a pancake, but with sticky inflation and fiscal policy continuingly loose, there is limited scope to the central banks' ability to manoeuvre.

(Quote Bloomberg) 

India’s central bank is close to the end of its record series of interest-rate increases as inflation will probably slow next year, Deputy Governor Subir Gokarn said.“You could say that the cycle is nearing its end,” he said, “given the projection that inflation will start coming down and will continue to move down from December onwards.” He declined to specify when the Reserve Bank of India may stop raising rates.

Worryingly, recent news out of China appears that the country may be turning Indian or at least that easing may not come quite as expected. Especially, it is bad news for the global economy in the near term (but perhaps good in the long run?) that Chinese authorities seem to be engineering a crack down on property developers which will not only lead to an acceptance of lower growth in order to effectively quell off balance sheet lending. 

It seems that investors hoping for emerging markets to drive forward the global economy may, for the moment, be guilty of too high expectations. 

Other Alpha Sources

I am not sure I buy the story that if China allowed its currency to appreciate all the world's problems would be brushed away in one clean stroke. But I concur that the appreciation of China's currency and indeed that of many of the big emerging markets primarily against the USD would certainly help. This is especially the case now that China (and the rest of the EM edifice) are sitting on a mounting inflation problem.

Dave Altig from the Atlanta Fed delivers a nice argument;

(...) if printing money does not buy you control over real stuff, it is very definitely a factor in controlling the nominal exchange rate—a measure of the value in trade of currency for currency. And there, I believe, is the crux of the problem. To keep the nominal exchange rate from rising, the People's Bank of China in effect prints yuan and buys dollars. Though this has limited impact on any real fundamentals, it is the source material for inflation. In fact, if a monetarist heart beats within you, the picture of the recent Chinese inflation experience will surely warm it.

I have long believed that one part of the problem here is the unique focus on China where the real focus should be on much broader based global currency alignment in which a basket of emerging market currencies appreciate against the G3 as a whole. This would then serve to rebalance global aggregate demand most efficiently.

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As an economist there are many things to feel negative about at the moment and I would honestly admit that also I must sometimes struggle not to descend into the bottomless pit of eternal doom and gloom. In that vein, I was refreshed by the Economist's recent look at 3D printing which basically covers a whole new and growing area of manufacturing (of everything imaginable) in 3D much the same way as printing a piece of paper.

THE industrial revolution of the late 18th century made possible the mass production of goods, thereby creating economies of scale which changed the economy—and society—in ways that nobody could have imagined at the time. Now a new manufacturing technology has emerged which does the opposite. Three-dimensional printing makes it as cheap to create single items as it is to produce thousands and thus undermines economies of scale. It may have as profound an impact on the world as the coming of the factory did.

It works like this. First you call up a blueprint on your computer screen and tinker with its shape and colour where necessary. Then you press print. A machine nearby whirrs into life and builds up the object gradually, either by depositing material from a nozzle, or by selectively solidifying a thin layer of plastic or metal dust using tiny drops of glue or a tightly focused beam. Products are thus built up by progressively adding material, one layer at a time: hence the technology’s other name, additive manufacturing. Eventually the object in question—a spare part for your car, a lampshade, a violin—pops out. The beauty of the technology is that it does not need to happen in a factory. Small items can be made by a machine like a desktop printer, in the corner of an office, a shop or even a house; big items—bicycle frames, panels for cars, aircraft parts—need a larger machine, and a bit more space.

Needless to say that this holds the potential to completely revamp manufacturing processes and re-define the nature of scale economies. However, apart from the potential to re-navigate the face of the already established manufacturing industry two things stand out to me.

Firstly, the notion of 3D printing brings the world of science fiction closer by leaps and bounds. Forget about printing a cup at home if you break one in the kitchen. Think 3D printing in conjunction with the emerging technology of manufacturing organs and other organic material. Then think about the promise that much less raw material need to be used and you are only a small step away from Picard pushing a button in Star Trek and invoking a meal or of course the irresistible scene in the Fifth Element in which an obviously hungry Leeloo creates a nice juicy chicken on a split second using, presumably, a small capsule containing the condensed raw material to create such a meal. Clearly, such things would easily be possible in a 3D printing setting and indeed, once transferred into a setting of "organic material", the possibilities are mind blowing. 

Secondly, I am in awe about the potential this holds for home and small scale manufacturing in connection with an open source environment. Obviously as the Economist points out, the flip side to this is that companies will need to come up with new ways to protect source codes (or blue prints) to their products since this would be the main source of their intellectual property. Yet, the heretic in me marvels on the potential of this coupled with some nifty reverse engineering. Imagine a complex product such as a Porsche 911. What if you could reverse engineer it, supply the material, and then feed the blue print into your generic manufacturing scale printer and presto, you would be the maker of luxury German (or Danish) sports cars. Clearly, how companies serve to protect themselves from exactly this kind of abuse is crucial to the success of 3D printing. But then again, one could easily imagine companies selling blueprints online to simpler products which consumers could then produce at home.

In short, if you want a positive view of the future look no further.

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Finally and perhaps because it spoke kindly to be prejudices in relation to the ongoing climate change debate, I really liked Leon Neyfakh's review of a new book by Colby College historian of science James Rodger called “Fixing the Sky: The Checkered History of Weather and Climate Control,”;

One can’t help but feel a little embarrassed on behalf of the species, to have been involved in all this fuss over something as trivial as the weather. Is the human race not mighty? How are we still allowing ourselves, in the year 2011, to be reduced to such indignities by a bunch of soggy clouds?

It is not for lack of trying. It’s just that over the last 200 years, the clouds have proven an improbably resilient adversary, and the weather in general has resisted numerous well-funded — and often quite imaginative — attempts at manipulation by meteorologists, physicists, and assorted hobbyists. Some have tried to make it rain, while others have tried to make it stop. Balloons full of explosives have been sent into the sky, and large quantities of electrically charged sand have been dropped from airplanes. One enduring scheme is to disrupt and weaken hurricanes by spreading oil on the surface of the ocean. Another is to drive away rain by shooting clouds with silver iodide or dry ice, a practice that was famously implemented at the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and is frequently employed by farmers throughout the United States.

And of course, the last paragraph strikes a special chord with me;

The good news for practitioners of weather control is that amid all this complexity, they can convince themselves and others that they deserve credit for weather patterns they have probably had no role whatsoever in conjuring. The bad news for anyone who’d like to prevent the next 2-foot snow dump — or the next 2 degrees of global warming — is that there’s just no way to know. As Fleming’s account of the last 200 years suggests, it may be possible to achieve a certain amount by intervention. But it’s a long way from anything you could call control. Those who insist on continuing to shake their fists at the sky should make sure they have some warm gloves.

Makes sense to me.

Risk On/Off?

Before I left for my summer break in Greece I asked, among other things, whether Hungary was trying to escape original sin or more specifically (and implicitly) whether Hungary is using the current relatively favorable market environment to claw back control over monetary policy. Recent comments from central bank Deputy Governor Ferenc Karvalits suggest that this may very well be the case (quote below from Bloomberg);

Investors see Hungary becoming “significantly” less risky, allowing for further reductions in interest rates, central bank Deputy Governor Ferenc Karvalits said. “Over the past few months, international risk appetite has improved significantly, the risk assessment of the region and Hungary has stabilized, and this allows for further easing of monetary conditions,” Karvalits said in an interview on Kossuth Radio today.

The Magyar Nemzeti Bank lowered its benchmark interest rate by half a percentage point to 8 percent on Aug. 24 as it works to jolt the economy out of its worst recession in 18 years. The bank has shaved 1.5 points off the key rate since July as confidence rises in the first European Union nation to get a bailout. Hungary received 20 billion euros ($28.5 billion) in an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund, the EU and the World Bank.

The country has a “good chance” to finance its budget deficit from the market and may not need the next installment of the IMF loan, Karvalits said. The forint weakened 0.3 percent against the euro and was trading at 268.82 at 7:48 a.m. in Budapest.

You see, one of the principal reason why Hungary is in such a mess is that as inflation shot up in the months leading up to the crisis Hungary chose to loosen its peg against the Euro. At the time, the rationale seemed wise albeit very bold. In an environment where investors were willing to take risk (i.e. hunting for yield) their objectives could be aligned with that of public authorities in the sense that the former got their yield whereas the latter got the nominal appreciation needed to keep inflation in check.

It did not work quite like that.

As the crisis hastened its grip on global markets and as its locus steadily moved to Eastern Europe the Hungarian Forint plummeted and lay bare the country's vulnerabilities in the context of balance sheet (on the liability) side denominated in Swiss Francs. The result was that Hungary crashed into a recession unable to tweak monetary policy downwards because of a fear that this would scythe the Forint and thus essentially bankrupt scores of households and companies. On the other, the government also had (and has) difficulties raising funds on international capital markets.

Now however things appear to have changed at least for a moment and Hungary's central seem poised to take advantage of the relatively benign market conditions to lower interest rates to support its ailing economy. The underlying idea is simple. If you believe that risk aversion is to stay low, the Forint should not be sensitive towards the lowering of nominal interest rates since after all the carry remains plentiful. In this way, my view is that Hungary's central bank is trying to claw back the control over monetary policy by locking in a lower interest rate for the Forint. The key question which we should be asking ourselves however is of course whether Hungary could actually be forced to raise rates further down the road to defend the Forint. Clearly, bets are being made inside Hungary at the moment that this is not the case.

This is very interesting in a practical as well as a theoretical sense as I have discussed for example in this post about carry trade and global monetary policy. More recently, Edward Hugh mused on the same topic (more or less) invoking the idea of the (eternal) triangle of monetary policy in an open economy context.

In the case of the Central Europe "four", Poland and the Czech Republic opted for maintaining their grip on monetary policy, thus accepting the need for their currency to "freefloat" and move according to the ebbs and flows of market sentiment. As it turns out this decision has served them remarkably well, since the real appreciation in their currencies which accompanied the good times helped take some of the sting out of inflation, while their ability to rapidly reduce interest rates into the downturn has lead to currency depreciation, helping to sustain exports and avoid deflation related issues.

The other two countries (Hungary and Romania), to a greater or lesser degree prioritised currency stability, and as a result had to sacrifice a lot of control over monetary policy, in the process exposing themselves to the risk of much more violent swings in market sentiment when it comes to capital flows. Having been pushed by the logic of their currency decision towards tolerating higher inflation, they have seen the competitiveness of their home industries gradually undermined, and as a consequence found themselves pushed into large current account deficits for just as long the market was prepared to support them, and into sharp domestic contractions once they were no longer disposed so to do.

Edward's account here is important since it alerts us to the fact that it was only at the very end that e.g. Hungary opted for float because it was believed that it would make the inflation problem go away. At that point however, the structural imbalances and essentially damage were already embedded in the system of course. Nevertheless, it is unequivocally the fact that Hungary, at the moment, is attempting to benefit from the relative benign market conditions which means that risk aversion remains relatively subdued.

Elsewhere in Market Land ...

If our little trip to Hungary suggests that risk is on, if only a little bit and potentially in the case of Hungary news elsewhere suggest that the waters are more choppy. Of course, none of this is earth shattering by any means of the word, but since much, if not everything, seems to be revolving around China at the moment it seems worthwhile to dwell at recent news on how China are expected to "tweak" its hitherto lax lending policies to skim the worst of the mounting bubble (quote below from Bloomberg).

China’s banking regulators are “tweaking” lending policies to remove “froth” from the system while growth remains the top priority for policymakers, according to Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc. The goal is to manage risk exposure among banks and asset quality by checking lending from going into A-shares traded on the mainland and properties, Wendy Liu, Hong Kong-based head of China research at RBS ABN Amro, said in a report dated yesterday.

(...)

The banking regulator sent draft rule changes to banks on Aug. 19 that would require lenders to deduct all existing holdings of subordinated and hybrid debt sold by other lenders from supplementary capital, said the people, who have seen the document and declined to be named as the matter is private. This may cut lending by as much as 700 billion yuan ($102 billion), China International Capital Corp. said Aug. 24.

Of course, the main bias of the Chinese stimulus program and thus the authorities' objective remain one of promoting growth through the expansion of domestic investment and, one would assume, consumption. As RBS ABN Amro's Wendy Liu is quoted of saying; "policymakers have a far greater tolerance for asset-price appreciation over the medium term than before". That sounds about right to me even if I am no sage, at all, on China.

What is interesting in the case of the recent news from China was also the following piece by Bloomberg whose headline (Yen Strengthens as China Policy Concern Spurs Demand for Safety) makes a direct link between policies in China and risk sentiment in the market and thus also the movement of the Yen and the USD (remembering of course the narrative that repatriation of profits may ultimately be the main driver of the Yen at the moment).

The yen rose for a third day against the euro in the longest stretch of gains since July on concern Chinese production curbs would slow economic recovery, fanning demand for the relative safety of Japan’s currency. The currency gained versus major counterparts including the pound on speculation Japan’s exporters are repatriating earnings to take advantage of a new tax law. A government report today may show a faster contraction in the U.S. economy than previously estimated.

“We have talks from China cutting back expanding, trying to sort out the balance sheet and prevent too much reckless lending,” said Peter Frank, a London-based currency strategist at Societe Generale SA. “But domestic factors, like capital repatriation, are driving yen’s strength right now.”

Whether there is a history to be made here is debatable, but one thing is certain. China seems to have decidedly taken center stage in the global market discourse. Finally and essentially as a small footnote, yours truly took notice of the fact that despite the decidedly positive sentiment in the core of Europe at the moment on the back of the Q2 GDP print and upbeat confidence readings in Germany, aggregate retail sales continued their steady decline.

Whether all this signifies that risk is "on" or "off" I will allow the reader to decide for themselves. Personally, I am still bearish, but it is difficult to deny that the relative calm and positive environment that has prevailed since spring seems rather strong. I would expect sentiment to change once we return to "normal" in Q4 once the elections in Germany and Japan have been resolved and, more importantly, once OECD stimulus packages start to wane. Most importantly however, there is the situation in Southern and Eastern Europe still loom as the most likely harbringers of, if you will, black swans in which case risk almost surely would be off.