First Act of Greek Default Proceedings Drawing to a Close

Global stock markets are up about 10% since the beginning of the year, volatility has collapsed, US economic data continue to defy even the mild slowdown proponents and the ECB seems to have backstopped the European banking system. 

Yes, my dear reader. This is how quickly you move away from the apocalyptic abyss and back to normal. My base case is that we are close to excess complacency in equity markets and a sell off is overdue, but it is exactly also under these circumstances (where smart money start to hedge) that the market may deliver one final run up to get everyone and the postman in before hosing everyone. 

In the short term, one of the only remaining stumbling block in the form of the ongoing default proceedings in Greece seem to be no match for the ongoing positive animal spirit of the equity market. Only a week ago, we got news that talks in Greece had stalled, but most recently we have been reassured that talks are back on track. 

The main niggle on the first occasion appeared to be what kind of interest rate that investors would get on their new bonds and thus, ultimately, the loss of face value currently said to be 50% but also, by some, claimed to be as high 62.5%. Another issue would be whether Greece would pass legislation that forces investors to participate in the debt swap if a majority of investors agree to the PSI terms. This was specifically being discussed in the context of a particular group of investors holding both CDS contracts and the underlying bond and who would maximize their payout on the former by forcing through a hard default. 

None of the terms seems have changed massively in the past week, but time is running out with March the 20th set as the final deadline as this is when Greece would otherwise have to make a payment of 4.5 billion-euro ($18.7 billion) on maturing debt. The general consensus is that if no agreement is reached, this date would mark the hard default. The reason for the optimism is then that we are very close to full surrender in the form of a 90% participation rate of creditors and, we are told, it is only a matter of time before the final 10% agrees. 

The details reported so far are as follows;

Quote Bloomberg (21 Jan 2012)

The parties are near an initial agreement under which old bonds would be swapped for new 30-year securities carrying a coupon that would begin at 3.1 percent, reach 3.9 percent and go as high as 4.75 percent, Athens-based newspaper Proto Thema reported on its website yesterday, without saying where it got the information.

The desired macroeconomic outcome of all this is obviously well advertised. In 2020, Greece is supposed to have a government debt to GDP ratio of 120% and presumingly some form of growth that would allow this level of debt to stay stationary or perhaps even decline over time. 

Let me be clear absolutely clear here. Within any conceivably realistic macroeconomic model, there is no way that Greece can reach a stable debt level with moderate growth under these conditions. Under the interest rate scenario noted above (let us with a average interest rate of 3.8% on the new debt) the nominal interest rate would still be substantially higher than the growth rate of the economy. The only way, the nominal debt level could then be kept stationary is by forcing the fiscal balance into surplus. However, the problem is that this affects the denominator in the debt/GDP calculation by sucking out demand (growth) from an economy already structurally impaired (within a currency union and all that).

The implications are obvious I think . The promises of stability that the PSI currently holds (even if it comes with considerable pledges of IMF money) are bound to disappoint. 

First act of several to come

First of all, let us be clear. Despite, politicians' mortal fright to use the D-word and the media's acceptance of this fact on the basis that CDS contracts are not activated under the PSI, this is a stone wall default [1]. Anyone, who bothered to take merely a scant look at the history of sovereign defaults will see that the current Greek situation fits well within the framework. Indeed, the proposition that this is not a default because CDS contracts are not activated is ludicrous since in the vast majority of sovereign defaults, the debtor country begins negotiations with creditors well before the actual default is forced upon it. The fact that insurance contracts bought to protect a creditor involved in such negotiations have now been rendered useless says more about the nature of the our modern financial system than it does about the definition of a sovereign default. 

Hence, we come to the real nature of this game. 

The deal which now seems to be close to completed by no means closes proceedings. It is very likely in my opinion that private creditors who are currently the only ones being forced to take a haircut due to seniority of the IMF and the ECB will face a near 100% loss on their holdings. The argument is simple. Given the amount of debt held by the ECB and the IMF and the fact that these two institutions are senior debt holders the debt held by private creditors becomes juinor debt and thus the tranche which takes the first (and in my opinion likely complete) loss in the event of a default. 

Of course, once we reach this point the issue of CDS contracts will rear its head yet again since if a 50-60% haircut can be considered voluntary anything beyond this becomes very difficult to characterize as such. Any rating agency would find it difficult not to classify further losses as a default and thus begins the fun in earnest. And then comes the ECB and IMF's share. It will be politically dynamite if the ECB had to print on the liability side to cover losses on the asset side on Greek sovereign debt [2] or if the IMF had to ask its contributors for extra cash to cover for losses on loans made out to Greece or any other economy. Obviously, much will be done to prevent this, but just look at the numbers of Greece's economy and you will see that it is not that outlandish, especially if Greece opts to stay in the euro zone. Finally, Greece only represents the starter here. Any deal agreed  in Greece will be ardently watched in Ireland and Portugal who will feel they are entitled to the same deal with their private creditors. 

Most tragedies have several acts, twists and turns. Investors should expect no less from the one currently being played out in the European sovereign debt markets. 

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[1] - I know that the legal smarty pants will wade in now noting that default is only used when a payment is missed, but fact of the matter is that sovereign debt restructurings and defaults throughout time have always been a long process. Claiming that the Greek situation is different because it is allegedly voluntary and CDS contracts not activated is pathetic in my view, nothing less really. 

[2] - In practice the ECB could do nothing and see its balance sheet shrink with the amount lost on the asset side (i.e. reduce lending to the banking system (delevering) with the amount lost on the bonds). However, in the event of a large loss beyond provisions (if any) it is likely that the ECB would "need" to credit reserves with the amount lost on Greek bonds (hence printing money) it would do this by increasing open market operations (the LTRO essentially) on the asset side. I mention the liability side first though since the mechanism would essentially be deleveraging. Whenever a bank takes heavy losses on loans it usually responds by raising capital AND reducing lending. Since the ECB can't really issue debt in the same way as commercial banks, it would need to either reduce lending OR if that is not possible issue liabilities to match the loss of which it is, as a central bank, free to do at its lesure. 

Banking follies in the eurozone

Edward Hugh has a brilliant analysis of recent events in the eurozone and especially how banks are leveraging the liquidity provided by the ECB to "cleanse" their balance sheet of bad assets and essentially exchanging these for freshly minted euro deposits at the ECB. I think we should be very clear what is going on here; this is essentially a covert recapitalisation of the European banking system and the ECB is in every sense of the word acting as a lender of last resort. 

Here is the relevant part;

Another area where the transfer of liquidity doesn’t show up as a change in aggregate excess liquidity is when banks offload their wholesale liabilities to other EuroArea banks and refund via the ECB. Here again, if they do it smartly, they can even earn a bit of “quasi carry” in the process, by buying back their debt at well below face value from those who are anxious to exit the periphery, and then refinancing at the ECB without writing down the underlying asset. This could be termed a liability “write down”, and again the procedure earns the bank a nice bit of income which can subsequently be used to help the recapitalisation process.

Take the Portuguese Bank BPI (the country’s fourth largest), which is making public tender offers to buy back its debt. If all concerned tender their bonds to BPI, BPI will pay something short of  €1.5bn cash to investors. Mortgages which were previously sitting in one of their SPVs will return to their balance sheet, and ECB money will now be on the other side financing them allowing significant profits (and capital) to be reported. In this particular tender the smallest discount is 35% and the largest is 65%. Investors may initially balk at the offer, since they will nurse a heavy loss (equal, naturally, to BPI´s profit) but ultimately they will probably be only too happy to be able to walk away from Portugal, and  with some cash in their pocket to boot.

Iberian banks were already aware of  the benefits of this kind of restructuring during the 2009-2010 liquidity wave, and went about quietly repurchasing their bonds (bank capital, securitizations, senior bonds) on a selective and private basis at a discount. Much of their reported profits in those years in fact came from either the ECB carry trade or this kind of  transaction.  So when we read that another Portuguese bank – Banco Espirito Santo – has just had €1 billion of debt guaranteed by the Portuguese state (a sovereign which can’t itself go to the markets) it isn’t hard to imagine that the process going on in the background is something similar to that seen in the BPI case, and that the debt is being guaranteed so it can  go over to the ECB to be posted as collateral.

The National Bank of Greece has been doing something similar. They recently offered to buy back some €1.5 billion in covered bonds and preferred securities,offering 70% of face value for the covered bonds and 45% for the preferred hybrids. As the bank itself says, “The purpose of the offers is to generate core Tier 1 capital for the group and to strengthen the quality of its capital base….The offers would generate a gain for the group.”

And Italian banks would seem to be doing something similar, since they issued around €40 billion in government backed bonds specifically to take to the ECB. The bonds are held by the banks themselves and stay on their books to maturity, their only purpose being to provide collateral for use at the ECB. In fact Italian banks took something like €116 billion from the LTRO, or almost 25% of the total. Perhaps this is why Unicredit CEO Federico Ghizzoni and other European top bankers met ECB officials in Frankfurt back in November, to discuss new rules for collateral.

In Spain securitised mortgages sitting on the balance sheets of the bank-ownedFondos de Titulizacion de Activos could also be recycled in this way (here’s a complete list, although note that these Funds are regulated by Spain’s CNMV and not the Bank of Spain, which is why their presence is relatively unknown and people are able to accurately say that the central bank has been very strict on SIVs, since they weren’t their responsibility).

That something like this may be happening, with the ECB “buying into” public and private  Euro Periphery debt  while investors are discretely getting out is suggested by this report in Bloomberg:

The euro is losing the relationship with riskier assets that underpinned the currency in 2011 as the deepening sovereign debt crisis reduces the creditworthiness of even the biggest economies in the region. The 17-nation currency has fallen 8.7 percent against the dollar since October, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index has gained 3.4 percent, and the correlation between the two dropped to 58 percent from a record 91 percent in November, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The euro had moved almost in lockstep with investments linked to growth, including stocks and the Australian dollar, since January 2011.

This decoupling is taking place as European Central Bank President Mario Draghi cuts interest rates and promises banks unlimited cash for three years to rein in soaring borrowing costs for governments… Strategists also anticipate more losses as the US economy improves while the euro zone shrinks, driving international investors away from the region’s assets.

So if the first two objectives were to help the struggling sovereigns, and enable the commercial banks to refinance their debt, then to some extent these objectives have been met. But what about the third objective, moving credit on the periphery to get the real economy moving again? Well, here the ECB’s measures are likely to have far less effect, and indeed what effect they do have may be in some way a mixed blessing, since the banks seem far more worried about demonstrating they have an adequate level of core capital than they are about participating in solutions to real economy problems.

While I would, in general, be hesitant in taking anything from Zero Hedge at full face value I think the following story on Unicredit adds flavor to this by providing further evidence on the points Edward mentions above. 

The story is clearly speculative but gets backing from Edward's accout above. The following seems to be a part of the general process which in itself is, in my view, absolutely mad.

Banks in weak countries have been issuing debt, getting a government guarantee, and then posting them as collateral at the ECB. There are examples of this for Greek banks for sure, but my understanding is it has also been occurring in Portugal and Ireland. It is the only way banks in Greece (and the other countries) can raise money.

The article then goes on to make this more alarming point (but really does not have evidence to back it up) that it appears that about €40 billion of the first LTRO was done by Italian banks (Unicredit?) that issued bonds to themselves and got a government guarantee, and then posted this asset as collateral for liquidity through the LTRO.

So, here is how I understand it.

Unicredit issues a 3m bill and gets a government guarantee so that whoever chooses to buy this bill knows that it will be backed by the sovereign (after all, this is still better than the bank even if the two are joined by the hip). The only problem is that it is being issued to itself with a permanent guarantee from the government.

From an accounting perspective this must be close to illegal in any meaningfully lawful jurisdiction, but I defer to experts here of course. The issue here is not then that the sovereign is guaranteeing a liability of a bank, we have seen this plenty of times and it is indeed the only way that some financials can issue debt, but rather that the bond never gets marketed to third party buyers. 

It is absolutely astonishing that this 3m bill is then being posted as collaterall at the ECB. But you must understand that it has to be posted as such as far as I can see since you can't hold your own liabilities.  So, the banks posts a bond issued to itself and posts it at the ECB and get freshly minted fresh euros credited to its bank account at the ECB. After the process, Unicredit still has the bond as a liability but instead of the same bond on the asset side (which is impossible) it has a deposit asset with the ECB.

If this is true, and the ECB is agreeing to this I must admit that it amounts to a serious bout of banking follies in the European banking industry. 

Random Shots - No Light at the End of the Tunnel?

One of the stories that caught my attention this week was the Bloomberg piece about how banks in London and New York are starting to jump ship on the old finance hubs due to fear of effects from planned regulatory tightening. 

Quote Bloomberg

Banks in Europe are exploring ways to cut costs by routing more of their trades and other business through overseas subsidiaries, a plan that may shift tax revenue away from London and loosen European regulators’ influence over the lenders.Nomura Holdings Inc., HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA) and UBS AG (UBSN) are among lenders preparing plans to book as much business as possible through legal entities in jurisdictions where tax rates are lower and rules on capital and liquidity are less onerous, the banks and lawyers and accountants working with them say.

(...)

Banks could record as much as 30 percent of the value of their trades through Hong Kong, Singapore and other jurisdictions instead of hubs such as London and New York without running into trouble with regulators, Matten said. Such a move would hurt traditional hubs such as London because assets are treated for tax and regulatory purposes in the country where they are booked. It would also allow banks to sidestep the U.K. bank levy, introduced last year to raise 2.5 billion pounds ($4.1 billion) from lenders operating in Britain, as well as any financial transaction tax imposed by the European Union.

Perhaps this is a sign of the times in the sense that both banks and market participants seem to be looking increasingly outside the boundaries of the developed world for growth, profit and eventually prosperity. Having just moved to the Big Smoke I would not necessarily lament a downsizing of the finance sector even if it is the pond that I also do my fishing for the daily meal ticket. Perhaps, if fast moving financiers chose to go to Singapore instead of London, the residents of the latter would not have to endure paying 300.000 GBP for a studio flat in Canary Wharf [1]. 

Of course, it may all be a red herring but it could also be part of a number of tentative signs that the locus of global activity on a variety of fronts is moving to new epicentres. Let us hope they do not travel entirely in our food steps. 

More generally, we just put out our monthly report and the outlook is very much wishy-washy. Surely, our leading indicators are pointing down, but after the market puke in August it seems to me that the end of the world had almost been priced in as the S&P500 hit the 1100 marker. In this sense, do not be surprised to see it ticking towards 1250 even if the recent job data were abysmal, but beware. The old range has been broken and we are finding a new lower one. Market prices have a tendency to become "normal" after a period and with global economic activity visibly slowing the fundamentals are not really on the bulls' side even if they point to the merits of chasing a counter trend rally after a 10% drawdown. 

More generally as I noted before, the divergence between respectable analysts is widening which always makes me take a few steps back. On the one hand I see both buy side and sell side analysts rather stubbornly sticking to their year-end S&P500 targets of 1300-1400 while other independent analysts put the fair value of the index at 900-1000. Both will obviously have an axe (or maybe even a book) to grind, but part of my job is to synthesize the consensus into a fairly straight road map for our clients, and it is getting difficult. 

I tend to side with the pessimists if only because I find it difficult to see how US corporates can continue to operate as efficiently as they have been doing so far. Gerald Minack had some excellent points on this in his latest report; 

A big medium-term uncertainty for DM equity investors is the sustainability of earnings. A decade ago, the big uncertainty was whether valuations could be sustained. They weren’t . The de-rating may have further to go, but clearly valuation is less of a headwind now than at the TMT-inspired peak. Earnings, on the other hand, are very high. Profits are now near an all-time high as a share of global GDP, and the real return on equity has followed . What’s not able, however, is not the cycle rebound, but the elevated level of earnings (and real returns) over the past decade. The forward-looking issue is whether those elevated returns can be sustained. At a global level, the answer may be ‘yes’ – for the simple reason it’s now possible to make profits in places where previously it was not. What’s not clear is the sustainability of high earnings in the developed world.

In particular, I would would point to the contradiction between continuing ultra low unit labour costs and the need to now see growth moving from cost cutting to topline growth. Something does not add up.

Real unit labour costs are now at 60-year lows. This matches the decline in wage share of GDP to a 50-year low. Arithmetically, this is the most important support for high profits. As I’ve discussed in prior reports, it’s not clear how long households can support consumer spending at near 70% of GDP with labour income at multi-decade lows. That’s been possible recently due to massive transfers from the public sector, but that support appears unsustainable.

In my opinion, this is big elephant in the room in relation to the US stock market. It will be difficult for earnings (and margins) to stay at current levels going forward. It follows naturally from the fact that if all companies cut costs and this improves margins this will only work for a limited period time as there are decreasing returns if everyone follows this strategy at the same time. Now we need to see topline sales growth for margins to be sustained, but this is obviously difficult with the current macroeconomic backdrop, so something has to give. 

Globally, coincident data is already slowing visibly across the globe with headline PMI readings and trade data coming in steadily lower. In that sense we are up against the wall again only so shortly after the shock of 2008/09 and this time, the ability of policy makers to respond is limited. 

However, I would be weary about calling this another 2008. One of the effects of experiencing a balance sheet recession with subsequent deleveraging is that trend growth falls and thus that the economy becomes liable to more frequent recessions. This applies to the US in particular but essentially also to the whole of OECD. This means that we will see more frequent but also essentially shallower recessions. The only qualifier here is really that some parts of Europe are now stuck in a depression locked in a vice of dysfunctional institutions and a lack of willingness and political capability to deal with the problems. 

As such, within Europe also lies the potential source a Lehman like shock should the crisis prompt a rapid and violent default of one or more sovereigns and/or financial institutions. Certainly, euro area banks are feeling the pinch as USD funding is getting cut off and if anything it seems to me that the EURUSD is looking a bit too strong for its own good given the backdrop of the mess in the euro zone. As cash levels at euro zone banks are drawn down the currency will adjust to fundamentals not to mention of course the fact that the ECB is slowly but steadily being pushed into full blown QE and monetisation of peripheral debt. 

The latest G&F provides a good summary; 

(...) The risk of a dollar rally against the euro in coming months is growing. This is because, sooner or later, the ECB will have to reverse its recent insane monetary tightening. Trichet made a start in this direction this week in his usual ponderous manner. Thus, he told the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament in Brussels on Monday that “risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments are under study in the context of the ECB staff projections that will be released early September.” The issue here is whether markets will allow Trichet to save face and not performs an abrupt U-turn before his scheduled departure from the scene on 31 October.

More generally, the recent comments from the IMF that euro zone banks need additional capital is once more a case of stating the almost obviously obvious. The transmission mechanism here is very simple. The market is now effectively pricing in a default of Greece and possibly other peripheral economies and this means that the attention must now turn to the losses that creditors will bear or, alternatively, the size of the bailout if we stick to the old mantra of no losses. As a good friend of mine pointed out recently, 

All trough last month’s banking shares’ collapse, I have been thinking that perhaps, equity investors are worried that the recapitalization will be different this time, with either the taxpayer (wrong solution) or the bondholder (rightly, through a bond-for-equity swap), massively diluting the shareholder. Politicians obviously do not have the stomach, nor the muscle for new bailouts.

Or to put it differently, there are no easy solutions left. One solution is the Brady Bond plan which is currently being floated in the case of Greece. The problem as I see is that it is fudged precisely when it comes to the current valuation of the bonds. Basically, there has to be pain today for the creditors, otherwise we are just kicking the proverbial can down the road as recapitalisation is avoided today but made worse for tomorrow. A solution for recapitalising banks today would naturally be for their creditors to accept a swap for equity and thus being moved into the frontline to absorb any losses that the banks would bear on sovereign debt, but that is not popular. Essentially, being degraded to equity holder in a bank with known sovereign assets in the European periphery is equal to taking a haircut on your initial investment, but all this then leaves the inevitable question of who and when someone will step up to take the lead in the debt restructuring. 

Of course, the idea of substituting debt for equity is the same principle applied in the case of Greece posting domestic assets (islands, utility companies etc) as collateral for credit. We can then think about this collateral as Greek sovereign equity and as with creditors of banks, it is all good in theory but in practice, not so well. 

Elsewhere, the game of Old Maid in global currency markets continue with the SNB still in the spotlight despite already having taken desperate measures to stop the appreciation of the CHF; 

Quote Bloomberg

While the Swiss National Bank has so far avoided currency purchases in its latest bid to keep a lid on the franc, it may soon have no alternative but to follow through on its threat to intervene, economists and strategists said.

But what really caught my attention was comments by Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega that lowering interest rates represents an effective antidote against an appreciating currency. 

Quote Bloomberg

For “the next two or three years, the conditions will be there for rates to keep falling,” Mantega told reporters in Sao Paulo today. “Falling rates are a good antidote for the gains in the real.”

Allow me to quote myself from the post linked above; 

Old Maid is a card game where the simple task is to avoid holding a given card (often the queen of spades) at the end of the game. Even in the company of good friends however, holding Old Maid at the end is not fun. Often, you have to buy the drinks, drop a piece of clothes, or endure other travails. And as it turns out, the global FX market is not unlike this good old game of cards where the Old Maid is proxied by having a strong currency on whose shoulders the correction of global macroeconomic imbalances must invariably fall. In this way, and although one sometimes get the feeling that everyone believes that everybody may actually export their way out of their current misery, buying one country’s currency means selling another and thus, someone (be it an individual economy or a group/basket of economies) must end up holding Old Maid.

The easy investment advice here is naturally to buy the Old Maid which means that just as the global financial punditry searching for clues as to what lies ahead for the global economy and the looming slowdown the SNB et al may have to skint yet awhile for light at the end of the tunnel. 

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[1] - No my dear reader, I am renting and I would never touch these things but they are there and they are being sold.