Other Alpha Sources

Team Macro Man has a nice perspective on what deflation might mean in the OECD context and it is difficult to disagree with the underlying rationale.

One sector that is glaringly not singing to the Deflationistas' hymn sheet is commodities. While a rapidly-growing global population continues to compete, like bacteria on a Petri dish, for the basic resources of food and energy, the input component to basic living will keep local prices firm even in an environment of other localised deflationary pressures.

The world is still steadily competing for raw materials, so any slow down in the West can only express deflation through lower wages as competition for jobs tightens and hence labour cost inputs fall. So whilst service sector (higher labour component) may see a higher relative price deflation, the basic cost of survival, food and energy to the individual stays the same, or rises as we are now seeing.

That isn't an individual enjoying deflation, that’s an individual suffering poverty.

I remain inclined to believe that the biggest problem for most OECD economies in the coming decades will be deflation (and the subsequent increase in the value of real debt) rather than inflation. But there is a world outside OECD too and especially commodities could very well be a source of inflation and thus in some sense stagflation (with the added spice that our relative wage in the West may fall at the same time)

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If you like me are prone to the occasional what the h'ck is going here mantle; this rap up by Gwen Robinson at FT Alphaville provides a good overview of the recent flurry. Highly recommended as the first read this friday morning or as weekend lecture.

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Jean Tirole is professor in Economics at Toulouse University and back in September 2009 he penned a very interesting article on illiquidity and what it means for a balance sheet (of a bank) to be liquid and illiquid.

The recent crisis was characterized by massive illiquidity. This paper reviews what we know and don't know about illiquidity and all its friends: market freezes, fire sales, contagion, and ultimately insolvencies and bailouts. It first explains why liquidity cannot easily be apprehended through a single statistics, and asks whether liquidity should be regulated given that a capital adequacy requirement is already in place. The paper then analyzes market breakdowns due to either adverse selection or shortages of financial muscle, and explains why such breakdowns are endogenous to balance sheet choices and to information acquisition. It then looks at what economics can contribute to the debate on systemic risk and its containment. Finally, the paper takes a macroeconomic perspective, discusses shortages of aggregate liquidity and analyses how market value accounting and capital adequacy should react to asset prices. It concludes with a topical form of liquidity provision, monetary bailouts and recapitalizations, and analyses optimal combinations thereof; it stresses the need for macroprudential
policies.

The best academic read I have a had in a long time.

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Eliana Marino takes a look a migration in the Baltics and tells one of the great unsung stories of this crisis and what it means when you loose your working age people to net migration;

- emigration of working age population makes the demographic burden increase: the number of inactive people (children and retired people) exceeds the number of active people, creating serious challenges for the sustainability of the welfare system;

- the most part of the outflows consists of working age population (from 15 to 65 years old) that includes people in reproductive age (from 15 to 49 years old). A huge number of emigrants in this particular age group means a further reduction of the natural increase of the population. In fact, they will probably have their children abroad or the migration decision itself will discourage the creation of numerous families.

I need to write a paper on this!

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Finally, Albert Edwards from Societe Generale is back from vacation (no link I am afraid) with another look at how the ice age scenario is coming along.

Inflation continues to ebb away. In Japan core CPI deflation, at -1.5% is the worst on record. While in the US, the corporate sector is seeing its weakest pricing power on record " even worse than that seen in the deflationary maelstrom during the Asian crisis (see chart below). We have consistently articulated the view that the severity of the current situation will only be appreciated when this current cycle ends in failure " and that is not too far away. That will be the time that equities will plunge to new lows. And that, not March 2009, will provide the buying opportunity of a generation to hedge against the coming Great Inflation.

Somehow he always manages to convince me of his ideas (at least in part) and boy does this sound good for those who are all cash at the moment. I also like the idea that the yield curve is a bad indicator when the Fed funds rate is at the lower bound. Still, the key issue here is not a double dip in the West (which is given in Europe), but a two-tempi growth market since Emerging Markets are already(!) inflating with a venegance and yield curves are flattening as short term rates increase. I know I have harped about this before, but it IS happening you know ...

I think Edwards misses this point (although he might just be making it differently)

A Week On the Wild Side (Latvian Edition)

Peering out of the window on a rainy and cold Sunday (election) afternoon in Copenhagen it is difficult not to paraphrase, yet again, one the Economist's many classic cover stories but really; it sure has been one hell of ride this week in Latvia. One wonders whether politicians and economists in the central bank really want to see what happens come tomorrow as markets and the flow of news re-commence. The truth however is that they really do not have a choice. Consequently and what actually started a little more than a week ago has now steadily turned into the well known story of politicians and official authorities doing their best to maintain a crumbling edifice. Markets, analysts, and commentators, on the other hand, are beginning to smell a rat and this particular rat looks set to gnaw its way right to the core of the Latvian economic edifice in the form of the Latvian peg.

Surely, the pressure has only piled on since I last wrote about this only a few days ago (see links above). The Financial Times' blog Alphaville in this case personified by Izabella Kaminska has steadily been supplying us with the latest on the unravelling in Latvia. A particularly good piece hammers down the point that it is not only freelance bloggers such as yours truly who are questioning the Baltic (Latvian) currency peg but also, now, most professional analysts close to the situation. This is a called a market discourse and although the commitment to maintain status quo may be there one cannot make the waters go back.

However and to be fair to all parties it does seem as if the Latvian authorities got the best of the discourse this week if, that is, being the last one to shout constitutes an upper hand in this case. Consequently, both the central bank and the premier minister Valdis Dombrovkis issued strong statements to suggest that the peg will hold simply because Latvia is committed to seeing this correction through.

Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovkis pledged to push through budget cuts and ensure the inflow of international loan payments as speculation grows the Baltic state may devalue, threatening the economy of Sweden. “These rumors and speculations should finally be stopped” about the devaluation of the lats, Dombrovskis, 37, said in an interview with Latvian Independent Television today. The currency will not be devalued, he said, and the country will pass budget cuts needed to get the next tranche of money.

This is of course all well and good, but one has the distinct feeling that all this merely constitutes the inevitable last launches before the opponent finally lands the kidney blow to send you crushing into the canvas.

In terms of a more thorough look at the Latvian situation which goes beyond the immediate plethora of market jitter you could do a lot worse than visit Edward's latest post on this issue. As he sets out pointing towards, overnight interbank rates rose to a record of 20% this week and it suggest more than anything the stress being levied on the system.

Another particular issue Edward deals with is the risk of contagion and essentially fallout from a devaluation in Latvia. Certainly, this is an important question in itself but I also agree with Edward [1] in the sense that the immediate plunge in other CEE currencies not to mention the Swedish Krona following a Latvian devaluation is not really the main issue here.

For the record, I see no decoupling and a Latvian devaluation would clearly force others to do the same, most notably I would think Lithuania and Estonia. As for the ripple effects towards the entire CEE edifice, they are likely to be substantial although not necessarily catastrophic. The real issue we need to understand I think is that that IMF program has problems and that this will become clearer and clearer as we move forward. Edward points to one very important data point in the form of a real effective exchange rate where numbers have just been published in 2008 format.

This gives a very clear image of the amount of down scaling the Baltics, and indeed many of the Eastern European Economies, need. It is important to understand that there is a level effect and relative effect here in the sense that one thing is to correct relative to one's own past level, and quite another to correct relative to others. Consequently, this is a chronic problem all across Eastern Europe and thus everybody has to correct. In this sense, the IMF are submitting those with pegged exchange rates to a dose of "medicine" which is simply too strong and which the domestic "system" cannot muster.

So, my feeling is that all this goes beyond whatever effect currency speculation would have in the wake of a Latvian devaluation/default. There are clear signs that the "exit strategy" from this crisis is not working and it is next to scandalous that the IMF/EU do not realize that while these countries certainly need a strong dose of "stick" to get themselves on the right track we need to ensure that they are not obliterated over the course of the next year. I mean, this talk about Euro adoption in 2012 is just so silly and counterproductive since who the heck knows where we are in 2012. Who knows, for example, where the Eurozone itself is in 2012. Really, I cannot stress enough how these road maps of convergence need to be rethought since there has been a structural break. We need a new plan and one which factors in the change in environment.

Moreover, I think we have established by now that the Eurozone is no magic potion and in fact faces a series of very severe tests on Spain, Italy not to mention the mental crush it will be when Germany does not recover because I can tell you; in terms of domestic demand she won't.  Basically as I see it, the option has always been to "let the CEE in", but that would also take a much stronger coordination on the fiscal side and essentially joint European financing through Euro bonds. At the moment, this is far to big a step for the gents in Frankfurt and Brussels to consider.

So, no decoupling in an immediate devaluation context, but more importantly, I tend to look at this more structurally than a simple question of how much the e.g. Forint and Leu will fall in the context of a Latvian devaluation.

At the end of day, this is a question of swallowing those camels and accepting the idea that the current solution being applied is out of touch with reality. Essentially, I don't think the parties involved quite understand the structural damage many of the CEE, and Latvia in particular, have suffered. As per usual I am implicitly referring to the importance of factoring in demographics but then again; it is absolutely amazing that none of the presumed experts here have not added this variable to the equation yet. As Edward says towards the end in his entry ...

That is, the simple fact of the matter is that there is no exit strategy. The programme simply doesn't work. It is "over determined", since whichever way you look at it, there is always one more problem than there is solution. Gentlemen. I think its time to give up. Honourably, but to give up. Come on out of the bunker, white flags and hands in the air will not be called for. There's a world out here waiting for you, it's on your side, and there will be a tomorrow.

I couldn't have put it much better myself, I really couldn't.

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[1] - There is a surprise :)