First Act of Greek Default Proceedings Drawing to a Close

Global stock markets are up about 10% since the beginning of the year, volatility has collapsed, US economic data continue to defy even the mild slowdown proponents and the ECB seems to have backstopped the European banking system. 

Yes, my dear reader. This is how quickly you move away from the apocalyptic abyss and back to normal. My base case is that we are close to excess complacency in equity markets and a sell off is overdue, but it is exactly also under these circumstances (where smart money start to hedge) that the market may deliver one final run up to get everyone and the postman in before hosing everyone. 

In the short term, one of the only remaining stumbling block in the form of the ongoing default proceedings in Greece seem to be no match for the ongoing positive animal spirit of the equity market. Only a week ago, we got news that talks in Greece had stalled, but most recently we have been reassured that talks are back on track. 

The main niggle on the first occasion appeared to be what kind of interest rate that investors would get on their new bonds and thus, ultimately, the loss of face value currently said to be 50% but also, by some, claimed to be as high 62.5%. Another issue would be whether Greece would pass legislation that forces investors to participate in the debt swap if a majority of investors agree to the PSI terms. This was specifically being discussed in the context of a particular group of investors holding both CDS contracts and the underlying bond and who would maximize their payout on the former by forcing through a hard default. 

None of the terms seems have changed massively in the past week, but time is running out with March the 20th set as the final deadline as this is when Greece would otherwise have to make a payment of 4.5 billion-euro ($18.7 billion) on maturing debt. The general consensus is that if no agreement is reached, this date would mark the hard default. The reason for the optimism is then that we are very close to full surrender in the form of a 90% participation rate of creditors and, we are told, it is only a matter of time before the final 10% agrees. 

The details reported so far are as follows;

Quote Bloomberg (21 Jan 2012)

The parties are near an initial agreement under which old bonds would be swapped for new 30-year securities carrying a coupon that would begin at 3.1 percent, reach 3.9 percent and go as high as 4.75 percent, Athens-based newspaper Proto Thema reported on its website yesterday, without saying where it got the information.

The desired macroeconomic outcome of all this is obviously well advertised. In 2020, Greece is supposed to have a government debt to GDP ratio of 120% and presumingly some form of growth that would allow this level of debt to stay stationary or perhaps even decline over time. 

Let me be clear absolutely clear here. Within any conceivably realistic macroeconomic model, there is no way that Greece can reach a stable debt level with moderate growth under these conditions. Under the interest rate scenario noted above (let us with a average interest rate of 3.8% on the new debt) the nominal interest rate would still be substantially higher than the growth rate of the economy. The only way, the nominal debt level could then be kept stationary is by forcing the fiscal balance into surplus. However, the problem is that this affects the denominator in the debt/GDP calculation by sucking out demand (growth) from an economy already structurally impaired (within a currency union and all that).

The implications are obvious I think . The promises of stability that the PSI currently holds (even if it comes with considerable pledges of IMF money) are bound to disappoint. 

First act of several to come

First of all, let us be clear. Despite, politicians' mortal fright to use the D-word and the media's acceptance of this fact on the basis that CDS contracts are not activated under the PSI, this is a stone wall default [1]. Anyone, who bothered to take merely a scant look at the history of sovereign defaults will see that the current Greek situation fits well within the framework. Indeed, the proposition that this is not a default because CDS contracts are not activated is ludicrous since in the vast majority of sovereign defaults, the debtor country begins negotiations with creditors well before the actual default is forced upon it. The fact that insurance contracts bought to protect a creditor involved in such negotiations have now been rendered useless says more about the nature of the our modern financial system than it does about the definition of a sovereign default. 

Hence, we come to the real nature of this game. 

The deal which now seems to be close to completed by no means closes proceedings. It is very likely in my opinion that private creditors who are currently the only ones being forced to take a haircut due to seniority of the IMF and the ECB will face a near 100% loss on their holdings. The argument is simple. Given the amount of debt held by the ECB and the IMF and the fact that these two institutions are senior debt holders the debt held by private creditors becomes juinor debt and thus the tranche which takes the first (and in my opinion likely complete) loss in the event of a default. 

Of course, once we reach this point the issue of CDS contracts will rear its head yet again since if a 50-60% haircut can be considered voluntary anything beyond this becomes very difficult to characterize as such. Any rating agency would find it difficult not to classify further losses as a default and thus begins the fun in earnest. And then comes the ECB and IMF's share. It will be politically dynamite if the ECB had to print on the liability side to cover losses on the asset side on Greek sovereign debt [2] or if the IMF had to ask its contributors for extra cash to cover for losses on loans made out to Greece or any other economy. Obviously, much will be done to prevent this, but just look at the numbers of Greece's economy and you will see that it is not that outlandish, especially if Greece opts to stay in the euro zone. Finally, Greece only represents the starter here. Any deal agreed  in Greece will be ardently watched in Ireland and Portugal who will feel they are entitled to the same deal with their private creditors. 

Most tragedies have several acts, twists and turns. Investors should expect no less from the one currently being played out in the European sovereign debt markets. 

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[1] - I know that the legal smarty pants will wade in now noting that default is only used when a payment is missed, but fact of the matter is that sovereign debt restructurings and defaults throughout time have always been a long process. Claiming that the Greek situation is different because it is allegedly voluntary and CDS contracts not activated is pathetic in my view, nothing less really. 

[2] - In practice the ECB could do nothing and see its balance sheet shrink with the amount lost on the asset side (i.e. reduce lending to the banking system (delevering) with the amount lost on the bonds). However, in the event of a large loss beyond provisions (if any) it is likely that the ECB would "need" to credit reserves with the amount lost on Greek bonds (hence printing money) it would do this by increasing open market operations (the LTRO essentially) on the asset side. I mention the liability side first though since the mechanism would essentially be deleveraging. Whenever a bank takes heavy losses on loans it usually responds by raising capital AND reducing lending. Since the ECB can't really issue debt in the same way as commercial banks, it would need to either reduce lending OR if that is not possible issue liabilities to match the loss of which it is, as a central bank, free to do at its lesure. 

Random Shots - Is it Over Yet?

It was telling that just as the ECRI and other notable research outfits decided to push recession button on the US economy the data flow became notably more positive. This could be a sign of the times that the cycle is just too volatile for even capable analysts to call or it could simply be a blip to the otherwise fundamental issue that economic weakness is here to stay for now. I for one do not share the opinion of those who believe that if ECRI gets this one wrong their reputation will be permanently damaged [1]. 

Risk asset markets made no mince of the recent stabilisation of the euro land crisis as well as the better news flow from the US economy. Just take the following headlines from Bloomberg and you know exactly what kind of sentiment I am talking about. 

Quote Bloomberg

U.S. stocks advanced, giving the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index its biggest weekly gain since July 2009, as retail sales beat economists’ estimates and the Group of 20 nations began discussions on Europe’s debt crisis.

(...)

U.S. 30-year bonds capped the longest weekly losing streak since January as concern eased that Europe is unable to curb its debt crisis and U.S. retail sales climbed, damping bets the country will fall into a recession.

The question is then whether it signals a decisive and lasting breakout or whether it was simply a rally to the top of a choppy range before we start another descend to test the lows. Recent weeks' market movement will suggest that you sell the current levels as top of a post crash range and I, for one do not think we are out of the woods yet. It is important to emphasize two issues on the US economy when it comes to the likelihood of a recession. 

Firstly, the US housing market has never recovered and inventories remain low. This means that there is not much room for the economy to slump even if it does enter a recession. Any recession is then likely to be relatively short. Secondly, all liquidity gauges we are watching are pointing strongly upwards which is likely to provide strong tailwinds for risky assets 9-12 months out. Excess global liquidity, US broad and narrow measures of money are all shooting up. 

In addition, we should consider the slow but sure movements by all four major central banks to increase either the short term liquidity or simply re-starting QE. 

The BOE put itself at the front of the pack with the recent addition of another bn 75 GBP worth of QE, but likewise at the ECB it was interesting to see that long term liquidity operations was re-instated together with an expansion of the covered bond purchasing programme. Additionally, the ECB has been and will continue to be more or less forced to support bonds in the periphery, particularly in Spain and Italy, in order to ring fence the periphery from the coming Greek default. In comparison, the Fed's latest much debated Operation Twist looks almost modest since it is, by the letter of the theory, not quantitative easing but rather qualitative easing [2]. Of course, the market is fully expecting the Fed to act aggressively should the economy falter further with a joint financing programme with the Treasury for long duration mortgage products as the most likely initiative alongside the more technical move in the form of reducing interest rates on excess bank reserves to negative. 

I think it is important to realise that the Fed, with its latest actions, have its gaze firmly fixed on stimulating a recovery in the US housing market which is seen as the most important missing leg in an already faltering US recovery. 

In Japan, the BOJ's situation is different in the sense that economic has been distorted by first the devastation of the earthquake and then obviously the technical recovery as supply side disruptions have eased off. I take note of the fact that the BOJ has verbally put a lot of promises on the table in terms of stimulating the economy not least, one would imagine, in relation to the ongoing strength of the JPY. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the BOJ's balance sheet has actually expanded briskly in the past two months. 

The main conclusion to draw here I think is that while it is certainly not over yet, developed market policy makers are starting to open the floodgates. The euro zone crisis will remain a severe drag and like an almost chronic illness will continue to flare up. A disorderly Greek default can still not be ruled out and as the euro zone policy makers seem to take comfort on even a second of calm it seems to me that the market will have to push harder before we get a realistic proposal for a Greek default. 

The recovery in the periphery (or obvious lack thereof) is still not working. The internal devaluation in the European periphery is alive and well when it comes to nominal wage increases which is getting a beating but in the context of lingering inflation in core and headline it leads to a squeeze in real wages and further depresses the recovery. The problem is that a sharp reduction in living standards through a decline in real wages to restore competitiveness is needed but if it occurs without any form of nominal currency depreciation not to mention in the context of very sticky core inflation, it just becomes counterproductive. Absent a fiscal union to socialise the risks it is difficult to see how the euro zone policy makers will be able to come with a fudge that will satisfy markets. In that regard I agree with Chris Wood here. 

Ultimately, GREED & fear’s view on all of the above remain the same. This is that the only coherent end game for Euroland remains a formal move towards collective fiscal responsibility, which would ultimately address the fundamental cause of the present crisis. This is the financial fault line represented by monetary union without fiscal union. Euroland either has to go down this path or it has to confront all the problems associated with a break up since in GREED & fear’s view there is no “middle way”

One positive development on Greece is that the private sector involvement (PSI) proposal originally envisioned seems to have been abandoned for a much more realistic haircut. 

But more challenging issues remain. 

It was hardly surprising that the S&P downgraded Spain last week which only serves to underline the issue that while Greece may be the imminent worry the real problem lies in Spain and quite possibly Italy. There is a limit to the amount of Italian and Spanish bonds that the ECB can buy as long as it is evidently clear that growth prospects continue to remain difficult. 

In emerging markets and touching on the theme I dealt with in my last installment the recent inflation data from India indicate why I continue to think that investors may hold too high expectations for easing in big emerging markets. 

Quote Bloomberg

India’s inflation exceeded 9 percent for a 10th straight month in September, maintaining pressure on the central bank to extend its record interest-rate increases.The benchmark wholesale-price index rose 9.72 percent from a year earlier after a 9.78 percent jump in August, the commerce ministry said in New Delhi today. The median of 21 estimates in a Bloomberg News survey was for a 9.75 percent increase.

Elevated inflation in India and China are crimping room for policy makers to ease monetary policy and support global growth amid Europe’s debt crisis and a faltering U.S. recovery. India’s central bank Governor Duvvuri Subbarao said yesterday that a more than 9 percent inflation is above “comfort level.”

Of course, the picture is not uniform here with notable economies such as Brazil and Indonesia already lowering interest rates but all eyes are currently on China (and secondarily India) and here I think that we will have to see stronger signs of a hard landing or a relapse into a more severe global slowdown we can expect policy makers to actively stimulate.

In summary, I think that we are indeed nearing an inflection point at which money printing in the developed world will once again provide relief to risky asset markets but the problem is that the underlying economic backdrop has not improved much. In particular, the ongoing lack of resolution in the euro zone represents an issue but Eastern Europe as well as a housing bubble in Australia (and perhaps even in Denmark) are also potential sources of uncertainty not to mention the unravelling of credit excess in China. As such, "it" is far from over but a tradable bounce in risky assets which goes beyond the current choppy range may soon present itself.  

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[1] - I have been working with and building economic models for a while and all I can say is that they are seldom 100% right and the margin of error is always there when analysts make calls. The key is your ability to make calls which are transparent and add value to decision makers' thought processes when they are made and not whether they were right in hindsight. This is not to say that it is unimportant to be right more times than you are wrong, but the future is awfully difficult to predict. If ever an analyst/advisor had a fiduciary role it is, in my opinion, to provide data and information which help investors making necessary decisions in the present not to make sure that the calls she made always come out right in hindsight. 

[2] - The distinction between quantitative and qualitative easing is simple. The former refers to an expansion of the balance sheet through the central bank increasing its liabilities and adding a corresponding amount of assets. The latter refers to changing the composition of the asset side of the central bank's balance sheet and as I am reading the gist of OT the Fed has committed to keep its balance sheet unchanged by selling short term bonds and buying long term bonds. Try this one for a good recap of what QE is and isn't. 

The Eurozone Bailout - Are We Still Standing?

As we are about move into the fourth day of the week where EU policy makers launched an unprecendented series of aid tools to combat the mounting risk of a collapse in the European periphery I am finally ready to move in with some thoughts. First of all, there has been no shortage of comments, opinions and market calls on the back of the bailout package and while risky assets have indeed rallied, it is as if the underlying reality of the situation looms ever more prescient underneath the surface than what one would have expected from such a collosal dose of stimulating policy.

And for good measure, let us re-cap the list of stimulating efforts taken by Europe and the IMF based on, no less than, Macro Man's last post as a financial blogger;

* €60 billion in cash from the European Commission, funded by bond sales
* €440 billion in loan guarantees, via pooled support of member governments
* Up to €220 billion from the IMF
* Outright bond purchases from the ECB, to be sterilized (this has evidently already started)
* 3m and 6m full-allotment LTROs
* Reactivation of FX swap lines

This is an impressive laundry list if there ever was one and among the points is the very, very interesting u-turn at the ECB which will now, albeit sterilised, be buyers of real assets. This last change of policy and the effectual skydive by part of Trichet and his accomplished out of the ivory tower may just be what eventually clinches it for Europe. Together with the most recent news this week that Portugal and Spain now seem to be getting the message in the form of introducing some very own austerity measures of their own (which as the song goes are of course complete voluntary and preemptive [1]) this might just be the combination of policy moves that Europe needs to see this through without a nasty default of a further intensification of the crisis.

But then again, it might not. I am sceptical here although I concede that if it is backed up by serious and real measures to rein in deficits I might just be turned into a believer. However, there are some things that still bugs me.

Firstly, it should not escape us here that what our dear policy makers effectively are doing is to fight fire with fire. More debt will thus be substituted with even more debt and it is not clear just what the end game is supposed to be. However, one thing which is now crystal clear to me is that if there is any way that the EU and the Eurozone are to make out of this in one piece it will mean a much tighter coordination of fiscal policy. This will require a monumental rethink of the EU setup and while I believe that the joint effort of EU policy makers could indeed be pooled to make this happen the chance of it actually materialising is slim. In this sense it will be interesting to see what exactly it will mean for  fiscal coordination (if any) that Eurozone economies are now jointly asking the market for funds to pool in that loan guarantee entity.

Secondly, the introduction and implementation of all these so-called austerity measures are not linear and we can't feed them into linear models and expect these models to come up with usable results. In this sense, and abstracting a minute from the general risk of doing too little too late, the road ahead is very difficult. On the good side it now appears that Spain and Portugal have waken up to the fact that they too need to turn on the screw and that what ultimately distinguishes them from Greece is merely market timing. This is universally good news, but it this is only a statement of intent. In fact, before we close the book on 2010 we don't really know anything since the 2010 budgets (already passed) are thoroughly in the red. The biggest problem here is simply that for all the good intentions in various EU commission and IMF proposals the actual process of implementation on the ground may prove near impossible. And here I am not talking about some innate laziness or non-voluntarism by part of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish people; I am simply talking about the impossibility of letting the entire burden fall on internal price and competitiveness adjustment from within an fixed currency union, but this of course has been the main issue all along. As I noted in another context, any state can only take so much of having to fight its own citizens with water and teargas week in and out even if they are trying to do good.

The considerations above have slowly, but surely, convinced me that while I support the efforts by EU policy makers (both in spirit and in terms of the technical measures) I have increasingly converged on the idea that some form of debt restructuring in Greece (and possibly elsewhere in EMU) has to be included in what we could call the main scenario going forward. In coming to this conclusion of course, I am met with formidable resistance.

Take for example the IMF's communiqué on the situation in Greece and why a debt restructuring would be a very bad idea (see also Emmanuel's take).

Restructuring debt would not help Greece’s capacity to grow. The type of fiscal and structural reforms being put in place under the Government’s program are designed to do that – to bring down costs, to make the labor market more flexible and to improve the business and investment climate.

The web of economic and political inter-linkages—including that Greek bonds are held by a wide variety of private investors and public entities—severely complicates alternatives to the program the government has put in place. Any perceived positive near term effects of a debt restructuring need to be weighed against contagion effects.

Most of the adjustment in Greece is needed to eliminate its large primary deficit (the deficit net of interest payments). This is the main issue for Greece, not the level of the debt.

My problem here is simply that the IMF misses the main point by a mile. It is thus exactly the combination of too high interest rates and negative nominal growth rates (deflation) which make the situation in Greece unmanageable and also why I  believe it was a mistake not to include some form of hair cut on Greek sovereigns (up front) as part of the Sunday's shock and awe move. Now, I don't dispute the point that the fiscal and structural reforms wouldn't help, but the numbers just don't add up. Greece is currently running a fiscal deficit to the tune of 12-15% and even if we assume that this will come down during the envisioned horizon Greece will still be caught in a debt trap once we are done. For a lack of a better comparison, Greece will come to resemble the Baltics and trust me, this is not a comparison you would like to be branded with. In this way, it is in fact the level of debt that will eventually force a debt restructuring in Greece and it will do so exactly because the terms with which Greece is about to embark on her structural adjustment are unsustainable from within a monetary union.

This brings us to the newfound QE profile by the ECB which could, in theory, make a lot of the problems of Greece (and Spain and Portugal) go away. However, we are alo moving into uncharted territory here. Consequently, echoes from Japan are coming closer and it is not altogether clear how the ECB would deal with the fact that it would have to permanently [2] massage the yields of Greek sovereign bonds in order keep the boat afloat. I emphasise permanent here since there is a real risk that the ECB has now decisively had its Japan moment and should the ECB commit to support for the Eurozone periphery it would not be a misnomer to dub the Eurozone Japan 2.0.

Among the long list of comments and analysis that has so far been ditched up to provide a view on the situation, I think that the one by John Hussmann comes very close to an adequate picture of the situation where you will forgive me, I hope, the following lenghty quote; 

Looking at the current state of the world economy, the underlying reality remains little changed: there is more debt outstanding than is capable of being properly serviced. It's certainly possible to issue government debt in order to bail out one borrower or another (and prevent their bondholders from taking a loss). However, this means that for every dollar of bad debt that should have been wiped off the books, the world economy is left with two - the initial dollar of debt that has been bailed out and must continue to be serviced, and an additional dollar of government debt that was issued to execute the bailout.

Notice also that the capital that is used to provide the bailout goes from the hands of savers into the hands of bondholders who made bad investments. We are not only allocating global savings to governments. We are further allocating global savings precisely to those who were the worst stewards of the world's capital. From a productivity standpoint, this is a nightmare. New investment capital, properly allocated, is almost invariably more productive than existing investment, and is undoubtedly more productive than past bad investment. By effectively re-capitalizing bad stewards of capital, at the expense of good investments that could otherwise occur, the policy of bailouts does violence to long-term prospects for growth. Looking out to a future population that will increasingly rely on the productivity of a smaller set of younger workers (and foreign labor) in order to provide for an aging demographic, this is not a luxury that our nation or the world can afford.

"Failure" and "restructuring" mean only that bondholders don't get 100 cents on the dollar. We can continue to bail out the poor stewards of capital who voluntarily made bad, unproductive investments, and waste our future productivity in order to make those lenders whole, or we can turn the debate toward deciding the best strategies for restructuring existing debt.

I agree with all of the above and it echoes my general sentiment which is not that Europe is about to sink into a hole, but that a real hard look at the face value of the obligations in Greece and elsewhere is needed.

As a counter argument to this point is the increasingly worrying barrage of numbers purporting to show the exposure of European and US banks to Greek sovereign bonds and indeed the bonds of Southern Europe. No matter where you look, the numbers aren't small and it does not take a lot of imagination to see how this could very easily turn into a Lehman 2.0 moment for banks and thus the real economy. The only problem this time would be that we would be, for the most part, all out of firepower. It is important for me to point out that it is not because I discount this event too easily that I am calling for a preliminary look into debt restructuring. It is simply because I believe that with the current road map, the end game is given in advance. This won't of course make the exposure any less grave, but did we really think that a haircut on the debt could be avoided here?!

In particular, if we are talking about banks playing the funky chicken on the short end of the Greek yield curve (is there any other?!) by sucking up liquidity in Frankfurt only to park it a couple of thousand kilometers further south, then it really escapes me if people had seriously imagined that this would not unravel at some point.

We all know that it will be a regime change when the first OECD economy pushes the restructuring button, but it was bound to happen at some point.  I'd thus recommend that we stopped kicking the can down the road and in stead picked it up and threw it away; only in doing so will be able to say that we are indeed still standing.

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[1] - This is pooh-pooh of course, but as long as they believe it themselves I am happy to indulge them.

[2] - Let us say for 10 years to begin with.