Search Blog Entries
Feeds for this site
References


License
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.
Contact and login
Currently Reading
  • Rabbit, Run (Penguin Modern Classics)
    Rabbit, Run (Penguin Modern Classics)
    by John Updike
  • Rabbit Redux (Penguin Modern Classics)
    Rabbit Redux (Penguin Modern Classics)
    by John Updike
  • The Coffee Trader
    The Coffee Trader
    by David Liss
SQP
Powered by Squarespace
The Conversation
« Current Account Fact and Fiction | Main | Evaluating Monetary Policy »
Monday
Nov302009

Global Liquidity Trap: A Simple Analytical Investigation

Ippei Fujiwara, Nao Sudo, and Yuki Teranishi (2009) - Global Liquidity Trap: A Simple Analytical Investigation, INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (BANK OF JAPAN) Discussion Paper No. 2009-E-31

How should monetary policy cooperation be designed when more than one country simultaneously faces zero lower bounds on nominal interest rates? To answer this question, we examine monetary policy cooperation with both optimal discretion and commitment policies in a two-country model. We reach the following conclusions. Under discretion, monetary policy cooperation is characterized by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), a key parameter measuring international spillovers, and no history dependency. On the other hand, under commitment, monetary policy features history dependence with international spillover effects.

Reader Comments

There are no comments for this journal entry. To create a new comment, use the form below.

PostPost a New Comment

Enter your information below to add a new comment.

My response is on my own website »
Author Email (optional):
Author URL (optional):
Post:
 
All HTML will be escaped. Hyperlinks will be created for URLs automatically.